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A necessary precondition for secure quantum key distribution (QKD) is that sender and receiver
can prove the presence of entanglement in a quantum state that is effectively distributed between
them. In order to deliver this entanglement proof one can use the class of entanglement witness
(EW) operators that can be constructed from the available measurements results. This class of EWs
can be used to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of quantum correlations
even when a quantum state cannot be completely reconstructed. The set of optimal EWs for two
well-known entanglement based (EB) schemes, the 6-state and the 4-state EB protocols, has been
obtained recently [M. Curty et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 217903 (2004)]. Here we complete these
results, now showing specifically the analysis for the case of prepare&measure (P&M) schemes. For
this, we investigate the signal states and detection methods of the 4-state and the 2-state P&M
schemes. For each of these protocols we obtain a reduced set of EWs. More importantly, each set of
EWs can be used to derive a necessary and sufficient condition to prove that quantum correlations
are present in these protocols.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important problems in modern cryp-
tography is the transmission of secret information from a
sender (usually called Alice) to a receiver (Bob) over an
insecure communication channel [1]. The goal is to guar-
antee that any possible eavesdropper (Eve), with access
to the channel, is unable to obtain useful information
about the message.
Secret systems were studied from an information-
theoretic perspective by C. E. Shannon [2]. He analyzed
the natural scenario where Eve has always access to ex-
actly the same information received by Bob. This infor-
mation, denoted as C (from the term ciphertext), is typ-
ically obtained by Alice as a function of the message to
be sent, M , and a secret key, K, that she needs to share
previously with Bob. In this context, Shannon defined a
cryptographic system to be perfectly-secret and uniquely
decodable if it satisfies the following two conditions: first,
the ciphertext, C, and the message, M , must be statis-
tically independent. This means that Eve cannot obtain
any useful information about the message M from C.
This condition can be expressed as I(M ;C) = 0, where I
denotes the mutual information measured in bits [2]. The
second condition states that Bob can recover the origi-
nal message M from C and K. It can be formulated as
H(M |C,K) = 0, with H the Shannon entropy measured
also in bits [2]. With this definition, Shannon proved the
well-known pessimistic result that every perfectly-secret
uniquely decodable system must satisfy H(K) ≥ H(M).
An example of a secret cryptographic system satisfying
this condition is the so-called one-time-pad or Vernam
cipher [3].
The result from Shannon relies in a fundamental way
on considering that both Bob and Eve have perfect ac-
cess to the same ciphertext C. However, there are scenar-
ios, such is the case in quantum key distribution (QKD),
where the proper exploitation of particular quantum ef-
fects can prevent Bob and Eve to receive precisely the
same information. The laws of Quantum Mechanics can
guarantee some minimal uncertainty between both sig-
nals, and this fact can be used by Alice and Bob to
expand a previously shared secret key K in an uncon-
ditionally secure manner [4, 5, 6, 7]. This means that
QKD together with the Vernam cipher can in principle
be used to achieve perfectly secret communications even
when H(K)≪ H(M).
In any realization of QKD one can typically distinguish
two phases in order to expand a secret key. In the first
phase, an effective bi-partite quantum mechanical state
is distributed between Alice and Bob. This state creates
correlations between them and it might contain as well
hidden correlations with Eve. Next, a (restricted) set of
measurements is used by the legitimate users to measure
these correlations. As a result, Alice and Bob obtain
a classical joint probability distribution P (A,B) repre-
senting the measurement results. In the second phase,
usually called key distillation, Alice and Bob use an au-
thenticated public channel to process the correlated data
in order to obtain a secret key. This procedure involves,
typically, postselection of data, error correction to recon-
cile the data, and privacy amplification to decouple the
data from Eve [8].
Two types of schemes are used to create the correlated
data in the first phase of QKD. In entanglement based
(EB) schemes an, in general, untrusted third party dis-
tributes a bi-partite state to Alice and Bob. This party
2may be even Eve who is in possession of a third sub-
system that may be entangled with those given to Alice
and Bob. While the subsystems measured by Alice and
Bob result in correlations described by P (A,B), Eve can
use her subsystem to obtain information about the data
of the legitimate users.
In prepare&measure (P&M) schemes Alice prepares a
random sequence of pre-defined non-orthogonal states
|ϕi〉 that are sent to Bob through an untrusted quan-
tum channel (possibly controlled by Eve). On the receiv-
ing side, Bob performs a positive operator value measure
(POVM) on every signal he receives. Generalizing the
ideas introduced by Bennett et al. [9], the signal prepa-
ration process in P&M schemes can be thought of as fol-
lows: Alice prepares an entangled bi-partite state of the
form |Ψ〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉|ϕi〉, where the states |αi〉 form
an orthonormal basis and {pi}i represents the a priori
probability distribution of the signal states |ϕi〉. If now
Alice measures the first system in the basis |αi〉, she ef-
fectively prepares the (non-orthogonal) signal states |ϕi〉
with probabilities pi. The action of the quantum chan-
nel on the state |Ψ〉AB leads to an effective bi-partite
quantum state shared by Alice and Bob. One impor-
tant difference between P&M schemes with effective en-
tanglement and EB schemes with real entanglement is
that in the first case the reduced density matrix of Alice,
ρA = TrB(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|AB), is fixed and known and cannot be
modified by Eve.
An essential question in QKD now is whether the corre-
lated data generated in the first phase enable Alice and
Bob to extract a secret key. In Ref. [10] it has been
proven that a necessary precondition for secure key dis-
tillation is the provable presence of quantum correlations
in P (A,B). That is, it must be possible to interprete
P (A,B), together with the knowledge of the correspond-
ing measurements, as coming exclusively from an entan-
gled state. Moreover, this result applies both for EB
and P&M schemes (For EB schemes see also [11]). Alice
and Bob need to be able to detect the presence of en-
tanglement in the quantum state that is effectively dis-
tributed between them, otherwise no secret key can be
obtained. Among all separability criteria available nowa-
days to deliver this entanglement proof (see, e.g., [12]
and references therein), entanglement witnesses (EWs)
[13, 14, 15] are particularly suited for this purpose since
they give rise to a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of quantum correlations in P (A,B), even
when the state shared by Alice and Bob cannot be com-
pletely reconstructed [10]. In Ref. [10] a detailed analy-
sis of two well-known EB protocols, the 6-state and the
4-state EB protocols [5, 6, 7], is included and the set of
optimal EWs to detect quantum correlations in both pro-
tocols has been found. The purpose of this paper is to
complete the results contained in Ref. [10], now showing
specifically the analysis for the case of P&M schemes. In
particular, we investigate the signal states and detection
methods of the 4-state and the 2-state P&M schemes
[5, 16], and we obtain a reduced set of EWs that can
be used to derive a necessary and sufficient condition to
prove that quantum correlations are present in these pro-
tocols. As a side point, we put into context recent results
that can be useful in the search of quantum correlations
for higher dimensional QKD schemes [17].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
review the role of quantum correlations as precondition
for secure QKD. Section III introduces the concept of
EWs and shows how to detect quantum correlations by
using the class of EW operators that can be constructed
from the available data. This formalism is then used in
Section IV to analyze well-known QKD protocols. Our
starting point are the EB schemes studied in Ref. [10]:
The 6-state and 4-state EB schemes. Then we present
the new results for P&M schemes, analyzing in detail the
4-state and the 2-state P&M schemes. The last part of
the section gives a brief outlook to the study of quantum
correlations in higher dimensionsal QKD schemes and in
practical QKD. Finally, Section V concludes the paper
with a summary.
II. QUANTUM CORRELATIONS & QUANTUM
KEY DISTRIBUTION
As mentioned in the introduction, the provable pres-
ence of quantum correlations in P (A,B) has been shown
to be a necessary precondition for secure QKD [10]. The
starting point for such a proof is an upper bound for
the distillation rate of a secure key from correlated data
via authenticated public communication, which is given
by the intrinsic information I(A;B ↓ E), introduced
by Maurer and Wolf [18]. These authors considered the
problem of key distillation in the classical scenario where
Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to repeated indepen-
dent realizations of three random variables, denoted as
A, B, and E, characterized by a probability distribution
P (A,B,E). In this context, Maurer and Wolf proved
that the rate of secret bits, denoted as S(A;B||E), that
Alice and Bob can get by communicating to each other
through a public authenticated channel satisfies [18]:
S(A;B||E) ≤ I(A;B ↓ E) = min
E→E¯
I(A;B|E¯), (1)
where the minimization runs over all possible channels
E → E¯ characterized by the conditional probability
P (E¯|E), and I(A;B|E¯) is the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob given the public announcement of
Eve’s data based on the probabilities P (A,B, E¯). This
quantity is defined in terms of the conditional Shannon
entropy H(X |e¯) =∑x∈X −p(x|e¯) log2 p(x|e¯) as
I(A;B|E¯) =
∑
e¯∈E¯
P (e¯)
[
H(A|e¯) +H(B|e¯)−H(A,B|e¯)
]
.
(2)
More important for QKD, the result of Maurer and
Wolf can as well be adapted to the case where Alice, Bob
3and Eve start sharing a tri-partite quantum state instead
of a joint probability distribution. For this purpose, one
can consider all possible tri-partite states that Eve can
establish using her eavesdropping method, and all possi-
ble measurements she could perform on her sub-system.
This gives rise to a set of possible extensions P of the ob-
servable probability distribution P (A,B) to P (A,B,E).
Now one can define the intrinsic information as
I(A;B ↓ E) = infP I(A;B|E) . (3)
The main consequence of this fact is that whenever the
observable data P (A,B) can be explained as coming from
a tri-partite state with a separable reduced density ma-
trix for Alice and Bob, the intrinsic information vanishes
and therefore no secret key can be established.
Observation 1 [10] Assume that the observable joint
probability distribution P (A,B) together with the knowl-
edge of the corresponding measurements performed by Al-
ice and Bob can be interpreted as coming from a separable
state σAB . Then the intrinsic information vanishes and
no secret key can be distilled via public communication
from the correlated data.
Proof: This is easy to see for EB schemes as we
extend a separable reduced density matrix σAB =∑
i qi|φi〉A〈φi| ⊗ |ψi〉B〈ψi| to a tri-partite pure state of
the form |Φ〉ABE =
∑
i
√
qi|φi〉A|ψi〉B|ei〉E . (See also
[11].) Here |ei〉E is a set of orthonormal vectors span-
ning a Hilbert space of sufficient dimension. If Eve mea-
sures her sub-system in the corresponding basis, the con-
ditional probability distribution conditioned on her mea-
surement result factorizes such that for this measurement
I(A;B|E) = 0. As a consequence, the intrinsic informa-
tion vanishes and no secret key can be distilled.
In the case of P&M schemes we need to show addi-
tionally that the state |Φ〉ABE can be obtained by Eve
by interaction with Bob’s system only. The initial state
|Ψ〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉|ϕi〉 can be written in the Schmidt
decomposition as |Ψ〉AB =
∑
i ci|ui〉A|vi〉B . Then the
state |Φ〉ABE from above is in the Schmidt decomposi-
tion, with respect to system A and the composite system
BE, of the form |Φ〉ABE =
∑
i ci|ui〉A|e˜i〉BE since ci
and |ui〉A are fixed by the known reduced density ma-
trix ρA = TrB(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|AB) to the corresponding values of
|Ψ〉AB. Then one can find always a suitable unitary op-
erator UBE such that |e˜i〉BE = UBE|vi〉B |0〉E where |0〉E
is an initial state of an auxiliary system. 
The natural question that arises now is whether the
presence of quantum correlations is also a sufficient con-
dition for secure QKD. Let us mention already here that
this is still an open question in the field of quantum cryp-
tography. In EB schemes, it is clear that it is possible to
obtain a secret key whenever the distributed bi-partite
states are entangled qubit states and each party is al-
lowed to perform collective quantum manipulations on
their respective states. This is true since in this situa-
tion one can first distill maximally entangled states from
the initial states and subsequently measure them out in
the standard basis [19]. The verification that the entan-
glement distillation process succeeded allows to give the
security statement about the resulting perfectly corre-
lated and random measurement data, which can then be
used as a secret key.
A completely different scenario arises once Alice and
Bob have already performed their respective measure-
ments on the given states and they can only use classi-
cal operations on their correlated data. This last case
has been partially addressed under additional assump-
tions, namely that the eavesdropping attack employed by
Eve is restricted to the so-called “incoherent symmetric
strategies”, in [20]. In this situation it has been proven
that for a particular class of QKD protocols key distil-
lation is possible if and only if the initially distributed
states are distillable [20]. In the same spirit, Ac´ın et al.
[21] showed that one can always distill a secret key from
any two-qubit and one-copy distillable states by adapt-
ing the local measurements to the quantum states and
performing subsequently a classical protocol. All these
results suggested the idea of a correspondence between
entanglement distillation and secret key distillation. See
also [22]. The main conjecture was that a quantum state
could lead to a secret key if and only if it is distillable,
which is not equivalent to containing quantum correla-
tions [23]. However, this point of view changed recently,
since it has been shown that it is also possible to gener-
ate a secret key even from certain non-distillable entan-
gled states, known as bound entangled or positive partial
transposed (PPT) entangled states [24]. These are states
that require entanglement to be created but do not al-
low to distill entanglement from them [23]. This shows
that the focus on entanglement distillation guided proto-
cols in QKD is too narrow, though the interesting exam-
ple introduced in Ref. [24] does not answer the question
whether all entangled states can be transformed into a
private key.
More recently, going back to the quantum correlations
point of view, Ac´ın and Gisin [25] proved that it is an
equivalent statement to show that there has been (real
or effective) entanglement in the distributed quantum
state and that the intrinsic information is non-zero. In
particular, this result implies that there exist a one-to-
one relation between the detection of entanglement in
P (A,B) and the fact that such probability distribution
cannot be obtained by classical means using only local
operations and classical communication [25, 26]. That is,
P (A,B) contains secret bits. More important for QKD,
this means that either it is possible to distill a secret
key from any bi-partite entangled state or there exits
a classical analog of bound entanglement, the so-called
bound information [27]. This is information shared by
Alice, Bob and Eve such as Alice and Bob cannot obtain
a secret key from it although this information cannot be
distributed by local operations and classical communica-
tion. However, so far the existence of bound information
has been proven for the multi-partite case [28] (for the
case of coherent manipulations of multi-party quantum
4states see also [29]), but not for the bi-partite case rele-
vant for QKD.
III. DETECTING QUANTUM CORRELATIONS
Given that quantum correlations are necessary for dis-
tilling a secure secret key, the question now is how to de-
tect these quantum correlations in a given QKD scheme.
More precisely, we have to answer the question whether
the joint probability distribution P (A,B), coming from
the measurements performed by Alice and Bob during
the protocol, allow them to conclude that the effectively
distributed state was entangled or not. In principle any
separability criteria (see, e.g., [12] and references therein)
might be employed to deliver this entanglement proof.
The important question here is whether the chosen crite-
rion can can be used to provide a necessary and sufficient
condition to detect entanglement when the knowledge
about the state is not tomographic complete. As we will
see below, it is a property of EWs that they allow to ob-
tain a necessary and sufficient criterion for separability
even when the state cannot be completely reconstructed
[10].
Let us first consider EB schemes. In these schemes,
Alice and Bob perform some measurements on a bi-
partite quantum state distributed by an, in general, un-
trusted third party and retrieve the probability distribu-
tion P (A,B) of the outcomes. Before showing that in
this scenario EWs are specially appropriated to detect
entanglement, let us recall some facts about witnesses
[13, 14, 15].
A witness is a Hermitean observableW with a positive
expectation value on all separable states. So if a state ρ
obeys Tr(ρW ) < 0, the state ρ must be entangled. We
say then that the state ρ is detected by W. In general,
for every entangled state there exists a witness detecting
it, however, this witness is in most cases very difficult to
construct. Witnesses can be optimized in the following
sense: A witness W1 is called finer than another witness
W2 if W1 detects all the states which are detected by
W2 and some states in addition. Finally, a witness W is
called optimal, when there is no other witness which is
finer than W [15]. Now we can state the following (see
also [10]):
Theorem 1 Assume that Alice and Bob can perform
some local measurements with POVM elements Ai ⊗Bi,
i = 1, ..., n, to obtain the probability distribution of the
outcomes P (A,B) on the distributed state ρ. Then the
correlations P (A,B) cannot originate from a separable
state if and only if there is an EW of the form W =∑
i ci Ai ⊗ Bi which detects the effectively distributed
state, i.e., Tr(Wρ) =
∑
i ci P (Ai, Bi) < 0.
Proof: One direction of the above theorem is clear: If
such a witness with the properties from above exists, then
the effectively distributed state is clearly entangled. To
prove the other direction, let us look at the the following
map, which maps a quantum state ρ to a real vector
A(ρ) ∈ Rn,
A : ρ 7→ A(ρ) = {A(ρ)0, . . . ,A(ρ)n}, (4)
where A(ρ)i = P (Ai, Bi) = Tr(Ai ⊗ Bi ρ). That is,
it maps a state onto the set of probabilities or expecta-
tion values of the POVM elements. This map is linear
and, in general, not injective. It maps the convex set
S of separable states onto the convex set S′ := A(S).
An entangled state ρ with the property A(ρ) ∈ S′ can-
not be detected with the given probabilities, since then
there is a separable state ρs being mapped to the same
A(ρs) = A(ρ), thus ρ and ρs are indistinguishable. So a
state ρe for which P (A,B) cannot origin from a separable
state must obey A(̺e) /∈ S′, Now we have the usual con-
struction of witnesses: There must exist a hyper-plane
separating A(̺e) from S
′. This means that there is a
vector w = (w1, ..., wn) with
∑
i wi A(̺e)i < 0 while∑
i wi A(̺)i > 0 for all ρ with A(ρ) ∈ S′. The observ-
able W =
∑
iwi Ai ⊗ Bi is now the desired EW, since
Tr(Wρ) =
∑
i wi P (Ai, Bi). 
We refer to witnesses that can be evaluated with the
given POVM elements and the corresponding correla-
tions P (A,B) as accessible. According to Theorem 1, the
set of all accessible witness operators gives rise to a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for verifiable entanglement
contained in the correlations P (A,B): The joint prob-
ability distribution P (A,B) can come exclusively from
an entangled state if and only if at least one accesible
witness in the set gives rise to a negative expectation
value when it is evaluated with P (A,B). Of course, in
this set there is some redundancy. Typically, it contains
witnesses that are finer than others, and therefore one
can construct smaller sets of witnesses that are accessible
and still have the property of being necessary and suffi-
cient for verifying entanglement. Whenever this prop-
erty holds, we refer to a set of witnesses W as being
a verification set. The ultimate goal will be to obtain
a minimal verification set in a compact description that
contains no further redundancies to allow an efficient sys-
tematic search for verifiable entanglement by evaluating
the members of this set. The rest of this paper is mainly
concerned with the search of these minimal verification
sets, although in the case of the 4-state P&M protocol
and in the 2-state P&M protocol we find only reduced
verification sets, which still may contain some redundan-
cies.
Before starting our quest for minimal verification sets,
let us consider the case of P&M schemes since in this sec-
tion we have considered, so far, only EB schemes. As we
mentioned previously, in this kind of schemes the reduced
density matrix of Alice is fixed since Eve has no access
to the state of Alice to try to modify it. However also
this situation can be incorporated in the theorem from
above: We can add to the observables Ai ⊗ Bi other
observables Ci ⊗ 1 such that the observables Ci form a
tomographic complete set of Alice’s Hilbert space. Those
witnesses that can be evaluated with this combined set of
5measurements can clearly be evaluated with the measure-
ments Ai ⊗Bi and the knowledge of the reduced density
matrix of Alice.
In the geometric picture obtained in the proof of the
theorem from above, the knowledge of the expectation
value of some of the observables implies that we know
that our state lies on some hyperplane in the space of
all expectation values. Then, we want to decide for a
point on this hyperplane whether is is in S′ or not, and
this can be done by witnesses. The knowledge of the
mean values of some observables may be used to argue
that only a smaller set of witnesses is relevant for such a
P&M scheme. We will see an example of this later.
Finally, let us emphasize again that there are many
other separability criteria besides EWs which might be
used for the detection of entanglement in quantum cryp-
tographic schemes. For instance, the security of the first
EB scheme proposed by Ekert in 1991 [6], the 4-state EB
scheme, was based on the detection of quantum correla-
tions by looking at possible violations of Bell inequalities
[30]. This criterion, or for example those based on un-
certainty relations [31], is directly linked to experimen-
tal data, which makes the implementation simple. An-
other interesting criterion that seems to be particularly
suited for the case of P&M schemes, where the reduced
density matrix of Alice is fixed and known, is, for in-
stance, the reduction criterion [32]. However, it is not
clear whether these criteria guarantee to detect all en-
tangled states which can be detected with the given set
of measurements. In fact, in the case of the 4-state, the
knowledge of the performed measurements together with
P (A,B) allows to detect entangled states beyond those
that violates Bell-like inequalities.
IV. QKD PROTOCOLS
We will now illustrate the consequences of this view
for some well-known QKD protocols. First we start re-
viewing the recent results obtained in Ref. [10] for the
6-state and the 4-state EB protocols [6, 7], which include
a minimal verification set to detect quantum correlations
in both protocols. Then we present the analysis for the
case of P&M schemes. We investigate the 4-state and
the 2-state P&M schemes [5, 16], and we obtain a re-
duced verification set for each of these protocols. Fi-
nally, the last part of the section gives a brief outlook to
the study of quantum correlations in higher dimensional
QKD schemes and in practical QKD [17].
A. 6-state protocol
For the case of the 6-state EB protocol, Alice and Bob
perform projection measurements onto the eigenvectors
of the three Pauli operators σx, σy, and σz on the bi-
partite qubit states distributed by Eve. In the corre-
sponding P&M scheme Alice prepares the eigenvectors of
those operators by performing the same measurements on
a maximally entangled two-qubit state. Note that here
we are not using the general approach introduced previ-
oulsy, |Ψ〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉|ϕi〉, to model P&M schemes,
since for this protocol it is sufficient to consider that the
effectively distributed quantum state consists only of two
qubits. In both cases Alice has complete tomographic
knowledge of her subsystem and therefore the class of
EWs, which can be constructed in both protocols, coin-
cide. The set of three measurement bases used in the
protocol allows Alice and Bob to construct any EW of
the form
W =
∑
i,j={0,x,y,z}
cij σi ⊗ σj , (5)
where σ0 = 1 and cij are real numbers. Note that the set
of operators {σi ⊗ σj}i,j constitutes an operator basis in
C2⊗C2. This means that Alice and Bob can in principle
evaluate all EWs, in particular, the class of optimal wit-
nesses for two-qubit states. This class, denoted by OEW,
is given by the witnesses operators of the form [33]
W = |φe〉〈φe|TP , (6)
where |φe〉 denotes any entangled state of two-qubit sys-
tems and TP is the partial transposition, that is, the
transposition with respect to one of the subsystems [34].
Therefore, in the 6-state protocol, both for EB and P&M
schemes, all entangled states can be detected and the op-
timal witnesses OEW form the minimal verification set.
Alternatively to the witness approach, Alice and Bob
can employ as well quantum state tomography techniques
to reconstruct the effectively distributed quantum state
and then use the Peres-Horodecki criterion [13, 35] to de-
termine whether that state was entangled or not. This
criterion establishes that a two-qubit state is separable
iff its partial transposition is positive. For higher di-
mensional systems, however, note that although all op-
erators with non-positive partial transposition are entan-
gled, there exist PPT entangled states [23].
B. 4-state protocol
While the analysis of the 6-state protocol is quite sim-
ple, due to the complete tomographic information that
Alice and Bob share, the 4-state protocol needs a deeper
examination. As we will show below, the class of OEW
for two-qubit systems cannot be evaluated with the given
correlations neither in the EB nor in the P&M versions of
the protocol. In the EB case Alice and Bob perform pro-
jection measurements onto two mutually unbiased bases,
say the ones given by the eigenvectors of the two Pauli
operators σx and σz . In the corresponding P&M scheme,
Alice can use as well the same set of measurements but
now on a maximally entangled state. Here again, like in
the 6-state protocol, we use the fact that the approach
|Ψ〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉|ϕi〉 to model P&M schemes can be
6reduce to employ only two-qubit states for this protocol.
Let’s begin our analysis for the EB scheme [10].
1. Entanglement-based (EB)
In the case of the 4-state EB protocol we will denote
the set of EWs that can be evaluated with the resulting
correlations as WEB4 . All elements are of the form
WEB4 =
∑
i,j={0,x,z}
cij σi ⊗ σj . (7)
This class of EWs can be characterized with the following
observation.
Observation 2 [10] Given an entanglement witness W
we find W ∈WEB4 iff W =WT =WTP .
Proof: To see this, we start with the general Ansatz of
Eq. (5) and we impose the conditions W =WT =WTP .
This directly constraints W to the form (7) since σy is
the only skew-symmetric element in the operator basis.
The reverse direction is then trivial. 
It is straightforward to see that the elements of OEW
do not fulfill this condition. Below, we will provide a cri-
terion to decide if an entangled state can be detected by
W ∈ WEB4 . This means that, in contrast to the case of
the 6-state protocol, in the 4-state EB protocol there can
be entangled states that give rise to correlations P (A,B)
that are not sufficient to prove the presence of entangle-
ment.
The concept of optimal witnesses introduced in Section
III for general witness operators can as well be extended
to the witnesses which are accessible with the given set
of measurements. This way we call a witness W optimal
in class C iff there is no other element in C that detects
all entangled states detected by W . Our goal now is to
characterize a complete family of witness operators that
are optimal in the class WEB4 . This family forms the
minimal verification set. Then it is sufficient to check
this family to decide whether the presence of entangle-
ment can be verified from the given data. To do this we
start presenting a necessary and sufficient condition for
a bi-partite state to contain entanglement that can be
detected by elements of WEB4 .
Observation 3 [10] An entangled state ρ can be de-
tected with a W ∈ WEB4 iff the operator Ω =
1
4
(
ρ+ ρTA + ρTB + ρT
)
is a non-positive operator.
Proof: To see this, let us start by the observation that
the symmetries of the witness operators in WEB4 give
rise to the identity Tr (Wρ) = Tr (WΩ). Now let us
assume that the operator Ω is non-negative. Then one
can interpret it as a density matrix. Since it is invariant
under partial transposition, it must be a separable state.
Since W is a witness operator, we must therefore find
Tr (Wρ) ≥ 0. As a result, we find that the non-positivity
of Ω is a necessary condition to detect entanglement of
the state ρ with witnesses in WEB4 . The reverse direction
is included here only for completeness and the proof is
included implicitly in Theorem 2. 
Next we present a set of EWs composed of optimal
witnesses in the class WEB4 which forms a minimal veri-
fication set of the 4-state EB protocol.
Theorem 2 [10] Consider the family of operators W =
1
2
(Q+QTP ), where Q = |φe〉〈φe| and |φe〉 denotes a real
entangled state. The elements of this family are witness
operators that are optimal in WEB4 (OEW
EB
4 ) and detect
all the entangled states that can be detected within WEB4 .
Proof: Let us start by checking that this family, in-
deed, can detect all entanglement that can be detected
in WEB4 . From the Observation 3 we know that we
need only to consider bi-partite states ρ such that Ω =
1
4
(
ρ+ ρTA + ρTB + ρT
)
is non-positive. We have, there-
fore, that there exists always an (entangled) state |φe〉
such that 〈φe|Ω|φe〉 < 0. Moreover, since Ω = ΩT ,
this operator has a real representation. In this repre-
sentation, also the state |φe〉 has a real representation
[36]. Let us define the projector Q = |φe〉〈φe|. Then
we find 〈φe|Ω|φe〉 = Tr
(
1
4
(
Q+QTA +QTB +QT
)
ρ
)
.
This means that we can define the operator W =
1
4
(
Q+QTA +QTB +QT
)
that can be further simplified
to W = 1
2
(
Q +QTP
)
thanks to the real representa-
tion of Q. This operator is a witness operator, since
Tr (Wσ) ≥ 0 for all separable states σ, while Tr (Wρ) < 0
for the chosen ρ. Moreover, by construction the family
of these witness operators detects all entanglement that
can be detected within WEB4 .
Finally, we need to show that all witnesses of this new
set W = 1
2
(
Q+QTP
)
are optimal within WEB4 so they
form OEWEB4 . In Ref. [15] it has been proven that, given
a set of witness operators SW , W ∈ SW is optimal in SW
iff for all positive semi-definite operators P and ǫ > 0,
W ′ = (1+ǫ)W−ǫP /∈ SW . When a P can be subtracted,
it has to fulfill 〈e, f |P |e, f〉 = 0 for all product vectors
|e, f〉 ∈ C2 ⊗ C2 with 〈e, f |W |e, f〉 = 0 since otherwise
we would not have a witness anymore. In the case of
witness operators of the form W = 1
2
(Q + QTP ), where
Q = |φe〉〈φe| and
|φe〉 =
1∑
i=0
ci|i〉|i〉 (8)
denotes the Schmidt decomposition of |φe〉, we have that
the |e, f〉 that satisfy 〈e, f |W |e, f〉 = 0 are given by |0〉|1〉,
|1〉|0〉, and the unnormalized states
|φ(λ)〉 = (λ|0〉 ±
√
1− λ2|1〉)(c1
√
1− λ2|0〉 ∓ c0λ|1〉),
(9)
with λ ∈ (0, 1). These product vectors span a three
dimensional subspace that is orthogonal to |φe〉. This
means that P cannot be subtracted from W unless P =
Q. But (1 + ǫ)W − ǫQ = 1
2
[(1 − ǫ)Q + (1 + ǫ)QTP ] /∈
WEB4 for all ǫ > 0. Therefore all witness operators
7W = 1
2
(Q + QTP ) with Q = |φe〉〈φe| and |φe〉 real are
OEWEB4 ’s. 
2. Prepare&Measure (P&M)
Once we have presented a set of witness operators that
is optimal for the EB scheme, we will show below that
this family is also sufficient to detect all entangled states
that can be detected in the P&M version of the 4-state
protocol. That is, with respect to the ability to detect
quantum correlations, both schemes can use the same
verification set. As we showed in Section III, in the case
of P&M schemes one can add to the set of observables
measured in the protocol other observables Ci ⊗ 1 such
that the observables Ci form a tomographic complete set
of Alice’s Hilbert space. So we have to add the operator
σy ⊗ σ0 to the observables in Eq. (7). This way one
obtains all the witnesses that can be evaluated in the 4-
state P&M protocol. This new set, that we shall denote
as WP&M4 , is of the form
WP&M4 =
∑
i,j={0,x,z}
cij σi ⊗ σj + cy0 σy ⊗ σ0 . (10)
where cy0 is as well a real number.
Now we present a result, Observation 4, that applies to
the observables given by Eq. (7) and that will be useful
to prove that the set of OEWEB4 obtained in Theorem 2
is also sufficient to detect all entangled states that can
be detected in the 4-state P&M scheme and, therefore,
it forms a reduced verification set of this protocol.
Observation 4 Given an observable W with W =
WT = WTP , then Tr(Wσ) ≥ 0 for all σ separable iff
Tr(Wσr) ≥ 0 for all σr real and separable.
Proof: (If) Using the fact that W = WT we have
Tr(Wσ) = 1
2
Tr[W (σ + σT )]. Note that the symmetric
matrix σ+σT is real and positive semi-definite because σ
is hermitian and positive semi-definite and transposition
is a positive operation. Moreover (σ + σT )TP is positive
semi-definite since σTP is positive semi-definite for all σ
separable. This means that 1
2
(σ + σT ) is a real separa-
ble quantum state. Therefore if Tr(Wσr) ≥ 0 for all σr
real and separable then Tr(Wσ) ≥ 0 for all σ separable.
(Only if) The proof is trivial. 
Theorem 3 The family of OEWEB4 , W =
1
2
(Q + QTP )
with Q = |φe〉〈φe| and |φe〉 a real entangled state, is suf-
ficient to detect all entangled states that can be detected
in the 4-state P&M scheme.
Proof: To be EWs, the operators WP&M4 given by
Eq. (10) must satisfy Tr(WP&M4 σ) ≥ 0 for all σ sepa-
rable. In particular, it must satisfy Tr(WP&M4 σr) ≥ 0
for all σr real and separable. We have that the term
σy ⊗ σ0 satisfies
Tr[(σy ⊗ σ0)σr ] = 0, ∀ σr . (11)
This means, therefore, that we need to guarantee that
the first term in Eq. (10) satisfies∑
i,j={0,x,z}
cij Tr[(σi ⊗ σj)σr ] ≥ 0, ∀ σr. (12)
According to Observation 4, we obtain that the term∑
i,j={0,x,z} cij σi⊗σj in Eq. (10) has to be an EW which
belongs to the class WEB4 . That is, W
P&M
4 =W
EB
4 +
cy0 σy ⊗ σ0.
To conclude the proof, now we have to take into ac-
count that in the 4-state P&M scheme the reduced den-
sity matrix of Alice is fixed and given by ρA =
1
2
1 . This
means that
Tr(WP&M4 ρ) = Tr(W
EB
4 ρ) (13)
for all ρ such as TrB(ρ) =
1
2
1 , since Tr[(σy ⊗ σ0)ρ] = 0.
That is, the entangled states that can be detected in the
P&M protocol are also detected by the class of witnesses
WEB4 . We have, therefore, that is sufficient to consider
the set of OEWEB4 . 
3. Evaluation
From the set of witness operators OEWEB4 given by
W = 1
2
(Q + QTP ), with Q = |φe〉〈φe| and |φe〉 a real
entangled state, one can obtain a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the presence of entanglement in the
observable correlations P (A,B). This result applies to
both versions of the 4-state protocol: EB and P&M.
Note that for the case of an EB scheme all the wit-
nesses in OEWEB4 are optimal and form a minimal veri-
fication set. However, for a P&M scheme some of them
might be redundant and therefore this set of EWs forms
a reduced verification set for this version of the proto-
col. The set OEWEB4 includes an infinity number of wit-
ness operators, but, as we will see below, these EWs can
be easily parametrized with only three real parameters.
From a practical point of view, this means that Alice and
Bob can easily check the conditions Tr(W ρ) with W ∈
OEWEB4 numerically.
Let us briefly analyze the implications of our results
in the relationship between the bit error rate e in the
4-state and in the 6-state protocols and the presence of
correlations of quantum mechanical nature [10]. Here the
error rate e quantifies the rate of events where Alice and
Bob obtain different results. It refers to the sifted key,
i.e considering only those cases where the signal prepara-
tion and detection methods employ the same polarization
basis. In an intercept-resend attack Eve measures every
signal emitted by Alice and prepares a new one, depend-
ing on the result obtained, that is given to Bob. This
action corresponds to an entanglement breaking channel
[37], i.e., it is a channel Φ such as I ⊗ Φ(ρ) is separable
for any density matrix ρ on a tensor product space. Such
a channel gives rise to e ≥ 25% (4-state protocol) and
e ≥ 33% (6-state protocol), respectively [7, 38], which
8A \B |0〉 |1〉 |+〉 |−〉
|0〉 0.08058 0.04757 0.02106 0.10709
|1〉 0.04623 0.07560 0.11349 0.00834
|+〉 0.11808 0.01690 0.09319 0.04179
|−〉 0.00873 0.10627 0.04136 0.07364
TABLE I: Example of a P (A,B) for the 4-state EB protocol,
where |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉). The table is normalized such as∑
i
P (Ai, Bi) = 1.
might seem to indicate that these values represent an
upper bound for the tolerable error rate in the protocols
(see also [39]). However, it turns out that for some asym-
metric error patterns, it is possible to detect the presence
of quantum correlations even for error rates above 25%
(33%) [10]. Let us illustrate this fact with two examples
that are motivated by the propagation of the polarization
state of a single photon in an optical fiber.
In the first example we will consider a channel de-
scribed by an unitary transformation that changes on
a timescale much longer than the repetition cycle of the
signal source, so it can be thought to be constant over
that time: for instance, the channel given by the unitary
transformation U(θ) = cos θ1−i sin θσy. In this scenario,
the resulting distributed state for both QKD protocols is
given by |ψ〉 = cos θ|00〉+sin θ|01〉− sin θ|10〉+cos θ|11〉.
The corresponding bit error rate is e = sin2 θ and e =
2
3
sin2 θ for the 4-state and the 6-state protocols, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, it can be shown that in both cases
the existence of quantum correlations can be detected for
all angles θ. The case of the 6-state protocol is clear, since
a unitary transformation preserves the entanglement and
all entanglement can be verified in this protocol. With
respect to the 4-state protocol, note there is always an
entanglement witness W ∈ OEWEB4 that detects quan-
tum correlations in P (A,B). In particular, let us use
W = 1
2
(|φe〉〈φe|+ |φe〉〈φe|TP ), with |φe〉 as the eigenvec-
tor of the operator 1
2
|ψ〉〈ψ|TP which corresponds to its
negative eigenvalue. Then we find in a suitable repre-
sentation as a pseudo-mixture [40] for the entanglement
witness that Tr(Wρ) =
∑
i ci P (ai, bi) = − 14 .
For the second example, we focus on the 4-state EB
protocol only and we consider the particular joint prob-
ability distribution P (A,B) given by Table I, where the
states |±〉 are defined as |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉). In
principle, it is not straightforward to decide whether
these correlations can be explained as coming exclusively
from an entangled state or not. This is specially so
since in this case the resulting bit error rate is given
by e ≈ 35.4%. To decide that question systemati-
cally we can use the verification set defined by OEWEB4 :
W = 1
2
(|φe〉〈φe| + |φe〉〈φe|TP ). The real states |φe〉 can
be parametrized as |φe〉 = cosφ|00〉 + sinφ(cosψ|01〉 +
sinψ(cos θ|10〉 + sin θ|11〉)), with only three real param-
eters φ, ψ, θ ∈ [0, 2π). Moreover, since the state |φe〉
is entangled these parameters satisfy additionally the
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FIG. 1: Illustration of several regimes of the parameters φ, ψ,
and θ leading to negative expectation values of the operators
OEWEB4 =
1
2
(|φe〉〈φe| + |φe〉〈φe|TP ), with |φe〉 = cos φ|00〉 +
sinφ(cosψ|01〉 + sinψ(cos θ|10〉 + sin θ|11〉)), when they are
evaluated on the joint probability distribution P (A,B) given
in Table I.
condition: sinφ sinψ(sinφ cosψ cos θ − cosφ sin θ) 6= 0
[41]. However, from a practical point of view it might
be easier just to consider all angles φ, ψ, and θ and
allow the evaluation of some positive operators. Af-
ter expressing the witness operators as a pseudo-mixture
[40] the condition Tr(Wρ) < 0 can be rewritten as∑
i fi(φ, ψ, θ) P (Ai, Bi) < 0, with ci = fi(φ, ψ, θ) for
some functions fi. Now it is easy to search numerically
through the space of parameters φ, ψ, and θ for quan-
tum correlations in P (A,B). This fact is illustrated in
Figure 1, where some combinations of these parameters
detecting entanglement when they are evaluated on the
P (A,B) given in Table I are marked.
To finish this section we show now that the family
of witness operators OEWEB4 allow to detect entangled
states beyond those that violates Bell-like inequalities
[30]. Note that, as we mentioned previously, the security
of the original 4-state EB scheme [6] was based on the de-
tection of entanglement by looking at possible violations
of Bell inequalities, which is in principle more restric-
tive than detection of quantum correlations. It is known
that a violation of a Bell inequality can be formally ex-
pressed as an EW [14], while the contrary does not hold
always. An interesting question then is to ask whether
the family of OEWEB4 correspond to Bell inequalities or
not. It is easy to see that the knowledge of the performed
measurements in the 4-state protocol together with the
joint probability distribution P (A,B) allow to detect en-
tangled states that do not violate Bell-like inequalities.
Consider for instance the two-qubit entangled states in-
troduced by Werner in [42] and which are defined as
ρW = p|ψ−〉〈ψ−|+ 1
4
(1− p)1 , (14)
with |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|01〉 − |10〉). In the probability range
1/3 < p < 1/
√
2 Werner states do not violate any known
9Bell inequalities [43] but nevertheless they can be de-
tected with the witnesses OEWEB4 for p >
1
2
. To see this,
note that the operator Ω = 1/4(ρW + ρ
TA
W + ρ
TB
W + ρ
T
W )
is a non-positive operator for p > 1
2
.
C. 2-state protocol
The 2-state protocol [16] is one of the simplest QKD
protocols, since it is based on the random transmission
of only two nonorthogonal states, |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉. Alice
chooses randomly a bit value i, and prepares a qubit in
the state |ϕi〉 = α|0〉 + (−1)iβ|1〉, with 0 < α < 1/
√
2
and β =
√
1− α2, that is sent it to Bob. On the re-
ceiving side, Bob measures the qubit he receives in a ba-
sis chosen, independently and at random, within the set
{{|ϕ0〉, |ϕ⊥0 〉}, {|ϕ1〉, |ϕ⊥1 〉}}, with |〈ϕi|ϕ⊥i 〉| = 0. Note
that alternatively to this detection method, Bob could
also perform a POVM defined by the operators F0 =
|ϕ⊥1 〉〈ϕ⊥1 |/2, F1 = |ϕ⊥0 〉〈ϕ⊥0 |/2, and Fnull = 1 − F0 − F1.
Using the ideas introduced by Bennett et al. [9], one
can also think of the preparation process in the following
way: Alice prepares an entangled bi-partite state of the
form
|Ψ〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|ϕ0〉B + |1〉A|ϕ1〉B), (15)
and then she measures her subsystem in the basis
{|0〉, |1〉}. Note that in this scheme the fact that the
reduced density matrix of Alice is fixed and equal to
ρA = TrB(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|AB) with |Ψ〉AB given by Eq. (15) is
vital to detect quantum correlations in P (A,B). Oth-
erwise, the joint probability distribution P (A,B) alone
does not allow Alice and Bob to distinguish between
the entangled state |Ψ〉AB and the separable one σAB =
1
2
∑1
i=0 |i〉〈i|A ⊗ |ϕi〉〈ϕi|.
We obtain, therefore, that the set of EWs that can
be evaluated in the 2-state protocol, and which we shall
denote as W2, is of the form
W2 =
∑
i={0,z}
j={x,z}
cij σi ⊗ σj +
∑
k={0,x,z,y}
ck σk ⊗ σ0, (16)
where the second term in Eq. (16) includes a set of ob-
servables such as Alice can reconstruct completely the
state of her subsystem. This family of witness operators
can equivalently be rewritten as
W2 = |0〉〈0| ⊗ A+ |1〉〈1| ⊗B + x C(θ), (17)
where A and B represent two real symmetric operators,
A = AT and B = BT , given by
A =
∑
i={0,x,z}
(c0i + czi) σi (18)
and
B =
∑
i={0,x,z}
(c0i − czi) σi, (19)
respectively, the parameter x is given by x = |cx+ icy| ≥
0, and
C(θ) =
(
0 eiθ 1
e−iθ 1 0
)
, (20)
with θ = tan−1(cy/cx). That is, we have included the two
observables σx ⊗ 1 and σy ⊗ 1 that appear in Eq. (16)
in the term x C(θ) of Eq. (17), while the remaining ob-
servables in Eq. (16) are included in the first two terms,
|0〉〈0| ⊗A+ |1〉〈1| ⊗B, of Eq. (17).
It is straightforward to see that, as in the case of the
4-state (EB and P&M) protocol, the class of witness op-
erators W2 does not allow to evaluate the OEW given
in Eq. (6). Note that the elements W in OEW sat-
isfy W  0 and WTP ≥ 0. The witnesses in the class
W2, on the contrary, fulfill W2 = W
TB
2
, which means
that WTB
2
cannot be a positive semi-definite operator
unless W2 is also positive semi-definite. Therefore, in
the 2-state protocol there can be also entangled states
that give rise to correlations P (A,B) that are not suf-
ficient to prove the presence of entanglement. In the
same way, it is interesting to note also that there are no
witnesses in the set of W2 that belongs to the family of
OEWEB4 =
1
2
(|φe〉〈φe| + |φe〉〈φe|TP ). To see this, note
that the representation given in Eq. (17) is incompatible
with the fact that the state |φe〉 is a real entangled state.
In the rest of this section we obtain a reduced verification
set of the 2-state protocol (Theorem 4).
The first requirement that an operator of the form
given by Eq. (17) must satisfy to be an EW is Tr(W2σ) ≥
0 for all separable states σ. Since the set of separa-
ble states is convex, this condition is equivalent to ask
Tr(W2|φ〉〈φ|A ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|B) ≥ 0 for all states |φ〉A|ψ〉B.
Let us start by considering states of the form |0〉A|ψ〉B.
We have that Tr(W2|0〉〈0|A⊗|ψ〉〈ψ|B) = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉, which
means that the operatorAmust be positive semi-definite,
i.e., A ≥ 0. In the same way, but now using the sepa-
rable pure states |1〉A|ψ〉B, one obtains B ≥ 0. This
means that the first two terms of Eq. (17), |0〉〈0| ⊗ A +
|1〉〈1|⊗B, represent a positive semi-definite operator and
the only term responsable to detect quantum correla-
tions is the one given by x C(θ). Note that this im-
plies that the class W2 does not allow to detect maxi-
mally entangled states |φe〉 = 1/
√
2
∑1
i=0 |ψi〉|ϕi〉, with
〈ψi|ψj〉 = 〈ϕi|ϕj〉 = δij , since in that case it turns out
that 〈φe|C(θ)|φe〉 = 0. This fact is not too surprising
since the distributed states in this protocol are not max-
imally entangled. Let us now come back to the general
case: Tr(W2|φ〉〈φ|A ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|B) ≥ 0. If we express the
state |φ〉A as |φ〉A = α|0〉 + β|1〉, this condition reduces
to
2|αβ|x ≤ 〈ψ|(|α|2A+ |β|2B)|ψ〉, ∀ |ψ〉 (21)
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and for all α and β such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. After
optimizing over the parameters α and β, Eq. (21) can be
further simplified to
x ≤ min|ψ〉
√
〈ψ|A|ψ〉〈ψ|B|ψ〉. (22)
That is, whenever the value of the parameter x is below
the bound given by Eq. (22), W2 has a positive expecta-
tion value on all separable states.
Now we will provide a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the operators W2 in order to detect entangle-
ment, i.e, to guarantee W2  0. First, it is straightfor-
ward to see that the operators A and B have to be of full
rank, otherwise according to Eq. (22) we have x = 0 and
W2 = |0〉〈0| ⊗A+ |1〉〈1| ⊗B ≥ 0. Now we can prove the
following observation:
Observation 5 An operator W2 = |0〉〈0| ⊗A+ |1〉〈1| ⊗
B+x C(θ), with A and B being two real symmetric pos-
itive operators, A > 0 and B > 0, and the operator C(θ)
given by Eq. (20) with θ ∈ [0, 2π) satisfies W2  0 iff
x > xmin with
xmin =
√
α
2
−
√
α2
4
− det(A)det(B), (23)
and where α = Tr(AB).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 4 The family of witness operators W2 =
|0〉〈0| ⊗ A + |1〉〈1| ⊗ B + x C(θ), with A and B being
two real symmetric positive operators, A > 0 and B > 0,
the operator C(θ) given by Eq. (20) with θ ∈ [0, 2π), and
such as x = min|ψ〉
√
〈ψ|A|ψ〉〈ψ|B|ψ〉 > xmin is suffi-
cient to detect all entangled states that can be detected in
the 2-state protocol.
Proof: According to the results presented above, we only
need to prove that given a witness operator W2  0 with
a value of x that saturates the bound of Eq. (22), and
that we shall denote as W2(xmax), is finer than the same
witness W2(x) with an x < xmax. That is,
Tr[W2(xmax)ρ] ≤ Tr[W2(x)ρ] (24)
for all ρ entangled and detected by W2(x). Since
W2(xmax) and W2(x) share the same operators A and
B by definition, Eq. (24) can be further simplify to
(xmax − x) Tr[C(θ)ρ] ≤ 0. (25)
Finally note that this condition is always fulfilled, since
(xmax − x) > 0 and Tr[C(θ)ρ] < 0, otherwise ρ cannot
be detected by W2(x). 
The coefficients of the pseudo-mixture decomposition
of the witness operators given by Theorem 4 can be
parametrized in this case with six real parameters.
D. Higher dimensional QKD protocols
So far we have searched for quantum correlations in
qubit-based QKD protocols which means we have re-
stricted ourselves to operators in C2 ⊗ C2. This fact
makes the characterization of a given class of witness op-
erators easier, since for systems defined in H = C2 ⊗ C2
and H = C2 ⊗ C3 all witness operators belong to the
class of so-called decomposable entanglement witnesses
(DEWs) which has a simple well-known form: W =
ǫP + (1 − ǫ)QTP , with P ≥ 0 and Q ≥ 0 satisfying
Tr(P ) = Tr(Q) = 1, and ǫ ∈ [0, 1) [44]. In the case of
systems of higher dimension than those in H = C2 ⊗ C2
and H = C2 ⊗ C3 not all the witness operators are
DEWs; for example DEWs cannot detect PPT entangled
states [23]. It is necessary to use also the so-called non-
decomposable entanglement witnesses (NDEWs). This
fact makes the characterization of witness operators more
subtle and so far it is still not clear how to construct
such witness operators even when the information about
the state is tomographic complete [14, 15, 45]. As we
mentioned already before, ideally the goal is to obtain
a compact description of the minimal verification set for
a given QKD protocol in order to systematically search
for entanglement in P (A,B). However, due to the fact
that the characterization of NDEWs is not easy to handle
it might be of interest to obtain, at least, one relevant
EW within the proper class as a first step towards the
demonstration of successful QKD.
Recently, it has been shown that a good deal of new
insight in the optimization of NDEWs can come from
the theory of convex optimization [17, 46, 47]. More
important for QKD, the problem of the minimization of
expectation values of witness operators W with respect
to pure product states,
min
|a,b〉
Tr(W |a, b〉〈a, b|), (26)
can also be formulated as a convex optimization problem
[17]. Solving Eq. (26) allows to obtain new witness op-
erators which are finer than W , even within a restricted
class WC of them [17]. To see this, let W ∈ WC and de-
note the result of the minimization problem in Eq. (26)
as ǫ = min|a,b〉 Tr[|a, b〉〈a, b| W ] > 0. Then the unnor-
malized new witness operator given by W˜ = W − ǫ1 is
finer than W and moreover it is guarantee that W˜ ∈ WC
since the observable 1 is always accessible. At first sight
it seems that this procedure requires to have already a
valid entanglement witness W for the given QKD pro-
tocol. However, this operator does not need to be an
entanglement witness in the strict sense, but can be
also a positive operator from the restricted set which
is more easy to characterize than an entanglement wit-
nesses [48]. With respect to the minimization problem
itself, it has been shown that although the polynomial
constraints parametrizing the pure states |a, b〉 are non-
convex and computationally expensive to handle, one can
apply results from relaxation theory of non-convex prob-
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lems [49, 50], notably the method of Lasserre [50], to
find hierarchies of solutions to that problem in a way
that each step of the hierarchy is a better approxima-
tion than the previous one [17]. Each step itself amounts
to solving an efficiently implementable semi-definite pro-
gram [51] and the hierarchy is asymptotically complete,
in the sense that the exact solution is asympotically at-
tained. This means that during several steps of the op-
timization method, better witness operators W˜ can be
obtained from W , belonging to the same restricted class
WC .
Finally, let us mention that, of course, not all higher
dimensional QKD protocols require the use of NDEWs to
derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the pres-
ence of entanglement in P(A,B). For instance, consider
the class of EB protocols in H = C2 ⊗ CN , where Alice
realizes projection measurements onto the eigenvectors
of the two Pauli operators σx and σz . In all these EB
protocols the accessible witness operators satisfy the con-
dition W = WTA . One can show that this fact implies
for the given dimensionalities that it is a necessary condi-
tion for a state ρ to be detected by W that the operator
Ω = 1
2
(ρ+ρTA) is a non-positive operator. To prove this,
note that Tr(Wρ) = Tr(WΩ). From the work by Kraus
et al. [54] we learn that whenever Ω is a non-negative op-
erator it represents a separable state. To summarize this
remark, we learn that all detectable states for this class
of protocols are negative partial transposed (NPT) en-
tangled states and can be detected by using only DEWs.
The situation changes once Alice performs also a projec-
tion measurement onto the eigenvectors of σy.
E. Outlook to practical QKD systems
The idea to check for quantum correlations in the ob-
served data with the help of a verification set of witnesses
applies also, in principle, to real implementations of QKD
setups [52]. One can incorporate any imperfection of the
sources and the detection devices into the corresponding
investigation within the framework of trusted devices. In
that framework one characterizes detection devices by
the use of an appropriate POVM description, e.g. on the
infinite dimensional Hilbert space of optical modes. For
P&M schemes, one has to characterize additionally the
given source via the reduced density matrix of the vir-
tual internal preparation state, as described before. This
idea then needs to be generalized to signal states that
are described by mixed quantum states. For this pur-
pose, one uses still a pure state as internal preparation,
but Alice’s signal preparation corresponds now no longer
to a projection onto an orthogonal set of pure states, but
to projections onto orthogonal subspaces, thereby effec-
tively preparing mixed states.
In those general scenarios, it will be difficult to provide
the minimal verification set of witnesses. Instead, one can
fall back to the approach to search for just one accessible
witness via numerical methods such as presented in the
previous section. In this way, one can search through
restricted classes of accessible witnesses at the price that
the result of this search will not be conclusive, i.e. this
search yields only a sufficient condition.
V. CONCLUSION
A necessary precondition for secure quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) is that sender and receiver can use their
available measurement results to prove the presence of
entanglement in a quantum state that is effectively dis-
tributed between them. Moreover, this result applies
both to prepare&measure (P&M) and entanglement based
(EB) schemes. This means that to construct practical
and efficient new QKD protocols, it is vital to separate
the generation of two-party correlations from the pub-
lic discussion protocol which extracts a key from those
data. Among all separability criteria to deliver this neces-
sary entanglement proof, entanglement witnesses (EWs)
are specially appropriate since from them one can derive
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
quantum correlations even when the state shared by the
users cannot be completely reconstructed.
In a recent work [10], the set of optimal witness op-
erators for two well-known EB schemes: the 6-state and
the 4-state EB protocols, was obtained and a necessary
and sufficient condition to detect entanglement in both
protocols was derived. The purpose of this paper was to
complete these results, now showing specifically the anal-
ysis for the case of P&M schemes where, contrary to the
case of EB schemes, now the reduced density matrix of
the sender is fixed and cannot be modified by the eaves-
dropper. In particular, we have investigated the signal
states and detection methods of the 4-state and the 2-
state P&M schemes, and we have obtained a reduced set
of EWs that can be used to provide a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the existence of quantum correlations
in both protocols.
Finally, we have discussed very briefly how to de-
tect quantum correlations in higher dimensional QKD
schemes and in practical QKD, where the characteri-
zation of EWs is not as easy to handle as in the case
of qubit-based QKD schemes. In this scenario it might
be still of interest to obtain one relevant EW as a first
step towards the demonstration of successful QKD. Here,
mathematical results from the field of convex optimiza-
tion theory can be used to get new insights in the con-
struction of finer EWs within a given class.
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APPENDIX A: CONDITION FOR W2  0
In this appendix we provide a proof for Observation
5. Our starting point is the most general form of the
operatorsW2 = |0〉〈0|⊗A+ |1〉〈1|⊗B+x C(θ). That is,
if we write the matrix element of W2 explicitly we have
W2 =


a c xeiθ 0
c b 0 xeiθ
xe−iθ 0 e g
0 xe−iθ g f

 . (A1)
Now we have to understand what the conditionW2 ≥ 0
imposes on the elements of W2. We have by definition of
the class W2: A ≥ 0 and B ≥ 0 or, since A and B are of
full rank, we can assume at this point A > 0 and B > 0.
Under this assumption, we can use the well known fact
that such a block matrix as in Eq. (A1) is positive iff its
Schur complement is positive [53], which implies here
A− x2B−1 ≥ 0. (A2)
Introducing the notation y = x2/det(B) the 2× 2 matrix
X =
(
a− yf c+ yg
c+ yg b− ye
)
≥ 0 (A3)
has to be positive. This is the case, iff det(X) ≥ 0 and
Tr(X) ≥ 0. After a short calculation, this implies that
ab− c2 − (ae+ bf + 2cg)y + (ef − g2)y2 ≥ 0, (A4)
(a+ b)− y(e+ f) ≥ 0. (A5)
When are these inequalities fulfilled for different values
of y ≥ 0? For y = 0 the matrix X is clearly positive.
If y increases X get first one negative eigenvalue. Thus
Eq. (A4) is violated, while Eq. (A5) is still valid. If y
increases further, the eigenvalues decrease and Eq. (A5)
gets violated. Finally, X gets two negative eigenvalues,
and Eq. (A4) is valid, while Eq. (A5) is still violated. So
we have to look for the smallest zero of Eq. (A4) which
is given by
y0 =
α
2det(B)
−
√
α2
4det(B)2
− det(A)
det(B)
, (A6)
where we have used α = Tr(AB) = (ae + bf + 2cg). We
obtain, therefore, that W2 is positive iff
x ≤ xmin, (A7)
with
xmin =
√
α
2
−
√
α2
4
− det(A)det(B). (A8)
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